In April, 2020, in an effort to facilitate a national pivot to telehealth in light of the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency (PHE), the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services Office for Civil Rights (OCR) announced a policy of Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) enforcement discretion for regulated health care providers (Covered Entities) implementing communications technologies that weren’t fully compliant with HIPAA or using those technologies in a manner that didn’t comply with HIPAA. Examples of flexibilities included allowing technology providers access to protected health information (PHI) without a HIPAA Business Associate Agreement (BAA). OCR’s enforcement discretion enabled Covered Entities to minimize the need for in-person visits for all kinds of health care services, not just COVID-19 related care. OCR also implemented flexibilities to promote public health during the COVID-19 pandemic; for example, it allowed for Business Associates to share COVID-19 data with government agencies for such purposes without specific authority to do so under BAAs.  

In response to concerns about the confidentiality of protected health information (PHI) related to reproductive health care less than one year after Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization decision, and the prospect of such PHI being weaponized by states and used against patients, the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services Office for Civil Rights (OCR) has proposed amendments to the HIPAA Privacy Rule to protect that information.

Covered Entities and Business Associates should promptly and carefully review their use of online tracking technologies on their websites and mobile apps following a bulletin (Bulletin) published by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ Office for Civil Rights (OCR) last week.  The Bulletin addresses multiple facets of compliance with HIPAA when using online third-party tracking technologies (Tracking Technologies).  In doing so, OCR significantly expands its interpretation of the definition of Protected Health Information (PHI) to include, in some instances, identifiable information gathered by Tracking Technologies where a user visits a website and does not interact with the entity in any other way. In its Bulletin, OCR interprets the act of an individual visiting a website as evidence of a relationship or anticipated future relationship between the visitor and the entity.

In this second of our two-part blog series on protecting health information post Roe, we discuss legal and practical strategies that health care providers can take to protect the information of their patients. State laws that restrict or criminalize abortions will require significant amounts of health information to enforce, putting new pressure on health care providers caught in the middle of  competing obligations to their patients and to regulatory and law enforcement authorities making lawful requests for this information.

Much has been written about how existing privacy laws such as HIPAA are unhelpful to women in the wake of Dobbs vs. Jackon Women's Health Organization ruling. In the first of this two-part blog post series, the Mintz team breaks down the legal rights and practical strategies that women can use to protect their own information.

A recent settlement agreement between a clinical laboratory and the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to resolve potential HIPAA Security Rule violations proves to be a cautionary tale for covered health care providers everywhere. There are two key lessons to note. First, a monetary penalty or fine may the least financially burdensome consequence of HIPAA non-compliance, because corrective action plans (CAPs) can be extremely costly. Second, in the context of a health care transaction, such as a merger or acquisition, non-compliance by one party to the transaction can prompt enforcement against the other party and even that party’s future business partners. This is the case even if the non-compliance preceded closing.

The Department of Health and Human Services’ Office for Civil Rights (OCR) has announced that it will exercise its enforcement discretion for health care providers’ and their business associates’ noncompliance with the HIPAA rules with respect to their good faith use of online or web-based scheduling applications for scheduling COVID-19 vaccination appointments. OCR will not impose penalties for such noncompliance during the COVID-19 nationwide public health emergency.

With a notably sharply worded opinion, the Fifth Circuit recently vacated over $4.3 million in penalties levied against the University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center (M.D. Anderson) by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) for a series of alleged HIPAA violations. The case stems from three separate incidents that occurred between 2012 and 2013. In two instances, M.D. Anderson workforce members lost unencrypted protected health information (PHI), while the third incident involved the theft of a faculty member’s laptop also containing unencrypted PHI. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit concluded that HHS’s civil monetary penalties order against M.D. Anderson was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law, vacating the penalties and pointedly criticizing the agency’s actions and arguments in this matter.

Beyond its harsh words for HHS, this opinion is notable for calling into question some longstanding HHS enforcement practices and interpretations of the HIPAA regulations. The opinion also makes clear that regulated entities should check the math when HHS levies a fine. Although limited in its precedential authority, the Fifth Circuit’s opinion, at the very least, gives HIPAA-regulated entities some new food for thought if faced with an HHS enforcement action.